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Abstract 
An  important evolution  in  the  retailing  industry  is  the  growmg  success  of store  brands. 
Still, their level of penetration  varies  widely  across  countries  and  industries.  We provide 
an  operational  measure  to  quantify  the  power of store  brands  along  two  dimensions:  the 
intrinsic  loyalty  of their customer base,  and  their  conquesting  power  to  attract  potential 
switchers.  Based  on  their  position  along  these  two  dimensions,  we  classify  store  and 
national  brands  as  "giants,  "misers",  "fighters"  or  "artisans".  We  use  the  proposed 
operationalization  to  evaluate  the  absolute  and  relative  strength  of  Albert  Heijn,  the 
leading Dutch store brand, in  19  product categories. 1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  his  influential  book  Managing  Brand  Equity,  Aaker  (1991)  starts  by  quoting 
Larry Light, a prominent advertising official.  Light argued that "The  marketing battle will 
be  a battle of brands,  a competition for  brand dominance ......  It will  be  more  important to 
own  markets  than  to  own  factories.  The  only  way  to  own  markets  is  to  own  market 
dominant  brands."  (p.  ix).  Light  apparently  referred  to  the  battle  between  manufacturers' 
national brands, which is  also  the  main  thrust of Aaker's book.  However,  increasingly,  in 
many  industries  this  almost  exclusive  focus  on  national  brands  is  misplaced.  In  many 
markets,  private  labels  or store  brands  have  become  a  dominant  feature.  Retailers  often 
"own"  their local  markets  and  they  do  so  by  developing  their own brands.  An  "extreme" 
example is  the  large  British chain Marks  &  Spencer, which  sells  all  products,  from  socks 
and  soaps  to  roast  chicken and  cashmere  pullovers  under its  own  St.  Michael  label.  No 
brand is immune to  the threat of store brands, as  Coca Cola learned in Great Britain where 
Sainbury's Cola,  launched in  April  1994  and  priced 28%  below  Coca Cola,  won  15%  of 
the  British  cola  market  in  merely  two  years  (Quelch  and  Harding  1996).  In  other 
countries  like  Canada,  Switzerland  and  France,  retailer  brands  already  claim  more  than 
20% of the flavored soft-drink market (Corstjens and Corstjens  1995). 
Store brands are becoming ever more important in the Western world.  This is  due 
to  a set of interrelated factors:  increased concentration in  retailing enables  retail chains to 
develop  their  own  brands  (Messinger  and  Narasimhan  1995),  consumers  attach  less 
importance to  established brand names  (Morgenson  1991), and consumers'  attitude toward 
store  brands  has  become  much  more  positive  (Steenkamp  1997),  because  the  quality  of 
store brands has dramatic  all y improved over the last  10-15 years (Karolefski  1990), among 
others.  Moreover,  large  retail  chains  have  advertising  budgets  of tens  of millions  of 
dollars.  For  example,  the  Dutch  supermarket  chain  Albert  Heijn  is  one  of  the  largest 
advertisers  in  the  Netherlands.  Marks  &  Spencer,  Sainsbury,  The  Gap,  Ikea,  Victoria's 
Secret,  and  Albert  Heijn  are  just a few  examples  of retail  chains  that  have  been  able  to 
build strong store equity. 
In  spite of the  emergence and  growing importance of store brands,  most conceptual 
and  empirical  research  still  focuses  on  national  brands.  In  this  paper,  we  try  to  partially rectify  this  relative  neglect  of  store  brands  in  the  strategic  marketing  literature.  We 
analyze  the  market  power  of store  brands  vis-a-vis  national  brands  in  more  detail,  and 
provide an operational measure of store-brand power that can be used to  identify strengths 
and weaknesses in  the  store brand's market position (1)  within a product category, and (2) 
across a portfolio of product categories in  which the  store brand is  used.  In  the paper, we 
focus  on store brands  in  the  grocery-retailing  industry,  where private  labels  are  especially 
prominent (Messinger and Narasimhan  1995). 
We first  provide  a brief review  of the  relative  market position  of store  brands  in 
various countries and product categories.  Next, we  describe an  approach to  operationalize 
the  market  power  of store  brands,  based  on  the  loyalty  of its  customer  base  and  the 
brand's  ability  to  attract  switching  consumers.  This  measure  is  derived  from  widely 
available  household purchase  data.  Then,  we  present  a  case  study  in  which  we  use  the 
proposed  measure  to  analyze  the  power  of  the  store  brand  of  the  largest  Dutch 
supermarket  chain,  Albert  Heijn.  We  analyze  the  position  of  its  store  brand  ("AH 
Huismerk")  in  19  product  categories.  Finally,  we  provide  conclusions  and  strategic 
implications for retailers and manufacturers. 
2.  THE MARKET POSITION OF STORE BRANDS 
A major factor in the emergence of store brands is  the  rapidly increasing concentration in 
the  retail  sector,  particularly  grocery  retailing,  that  can  be  observed  in  many  Western 
countries.  In smaller European countries, like Sweden .or the Netherlands, the three largest 
chains  already  account for  more than  60%  of total  grocery  sales,  while this  percentage is 
around  40%  for  larger  European  countries  such  as  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Germany. 
Only in  the US, Japan, and Southern Europe is  this concentration below 20%.  Note though 
that  in  many individual states  of the  US,  the  level  of concentration is  comparable to  that 
of individual EU countries (Heijbroek et al.  1995). 
This increased concentration in  retailing allows  supermarket chains to  develop their 
own  brands.  Figure  1  shows  the  market  share  of store  brands  in  the  grocery  retailing 
industry  across  a number of industrialized countries.  In  Great Britain, the  market share of 
store  brands  is  approaching  40%,  and  it  is  even  above  50%  for  the  leading  grocery 
2 retailer,  Sainsbury  (AGBIEuropanel  1992).  Store  brands  also  have  a  substantial  market 
share  in  many  other  countries.  Only  in  Southern  Europe  are  private  labels  still  less 
important. 
--- Figure  1 about here ---
The  market share  in  Europe  of private  labels  has  increased  substantially  over the 
last  15  years.  For example,  private  label  shares  in  1980  (1992)  in  France,  Great  Britain, 
and  Spain  were  11 %  (17%),  22%  (37%),  and  2%  (8%).  One  reason  for  this  growth  in 
market  share  is  that  retail  chains  are  increasingly  extending  the  range  of products  sold 
under  store  brands  from  mass-consumption  basic  products  (oils,  jams,  pastry  products, 
etc.)  to  more  sophisticated  products  (sauces,  diet  products,  cosmetics,  breakfast  cereals, 
etc.).  A  manager  at  the  French  supermarket  chain  Carrefour  put  it  as  follows:  "We 
launched  our first  Carrefour products  on  the  basic markets ...  We  are  now  attacking  more 
sophisticated markets .... If we  want to  promote the Carrefour label, and by this means, add 
value  to  the  Carrefour  chain,  we  must  attack  new  sectors,  cutting-edge  markets,  the 
strongly marketed sectors." (AGBIEuropanel 1992, p.  190). 
Interestingly, in the US,  the private-label share in  1992 is less than  1  % higher than 
it  was  in  1971.  Hoch  (1996)  argues  that  this  striking difference  may  be due to  European 
countries  having smaller national  markets  with fewer strong  national competitors and less 
economies of scale in  production and marketing, a higher level of retail concentration, and 
the devotion of more managerial attention to  store brands. 
Carrying a store brand in  a particular product ~ategory means  that the  retailer has 
to  perform a number of marketing tasks  that are  normally  performed by  the manufacturer, 
such as  branding,  packaging,  inventory,  promotions, and  advertising.  Nevertheless,  private 
labels can be very profitable as  the gross margin on store brands is  higher than on national 
brands  (e.g.,  20-30%  in  the  US;  Hoch  and  Banerji  1993).  Le  Roch,  head  of the  French 
supermarket  chain  Intermarche  explains:  "National  brands  are  now  sold  with  nil  or even 
negative  margins.  We  must therefore limit their market share  by  putting forward  our own 
labels."  (AGBIEuropanel  1992,  p.  187).  Store brands also  strengthen the  retailer's  position 
vis-a-vis  manufacturers.  They  were  often  introduced  as  "best-value"  products,  but 
increasingly,  retail  chains  have  improved  their  quality  in  order  to  raise  the  image  of the 
3 chain, and to  encourage consumer loyalty  to  the  chain rather than  to  national  brands.  As 
it  was  put by one British retail  manager:  "Customers'  loyalty  is  a fundamental  reason for 
having  own  labels.  If you  have  a  nucleus  of products  which  customers  see  as  having  a 
quality  image,  there  is  an  inevitable  dynamic  created."  A  manager  of the  French  chain 
Paridoc  argued that  "Our private  labels  are  an  indispensable part of our range  on offer," 
while an Euromarche manager stated that private labels is  "what consumers want; it makes . 
them loyal to the chain" (AGBIEuropanel  1992, p.  181,  187). 
Customer loyalty  to  store  brands  is  only  possible if they  have  a  favorable  Image. 
Research  in  the  five  largest  EU  countries  indicates  that  this  is  indeed  the  case.  Many 
consumers  feel  that  store  brands  have  about  the  same  quality  as  national  brands  and 
mspire  as  much  confidence,  while  they  are  cheaper  (see  Steenkamp  1997  for  details). 
Quality  is  a  major factor  in  consumer purchase  decisions  (Hoch  1996,  Steenkamp  1989). 
Store  brands  have  succeeded  in  substantially  narrowing  the  perceived  quality  gap,  and 
thus,  a  major  reason  to  buy  a  higher-priced  national  brand  has  been  eliminated.  These 
findings  do  not bode  well  for  national  brands  which  have  traditionally  been sold on  the 
basis of high and constant quality that one can trust. 
However, the penetration of private labels varies not only across countries, but also 
across  product  categories.  In  the  US,  private  labels  account  for  only  less  than  5%  of 
supermarket  sales  of health and beauty  aids,  as  opposed to  over 20%  in  the  refrigerated 
.  foods  section (Hoch and Banerji 1993).  In Great Britain, the market share of store brands 
is  less  than  10%  for  dog  and cat food,  but above  50%  in such categories as  hard cheese, 
kitchen  rolls,  cleaning cloths,  fruit juices,  and  frozen  vegetables.  Private  labels  account 
for about 40% of total sales in France in such categories as  toilet tissues, kitchen rolls, and 
green  peas  versus  less  than  10%  for  beer,  heavy  duty  detergents,  and  shampoo 
(AGBIEuropanel  1992).  In  the Netherlands, the three major private-label brands capture a 
much larger share in the coffee, green-peas, and apple-sauce categories (>20%) than in the 
margarine  and  sanitary-towel  markets  «  10%).  These  differences  in  penetration  level 
have  been  linked  to  the  private  label's  perceived  quality  (Hoch  and  Banerji  1993),  the 
industry's  innovativeness  (Corstjens  and  Corstjens  1995),  the  extent of price  competition 
between the national brands in the  category (Raju et al.  1995), the  size of the category and 
4 its  profit  margms  (Hoch  and  Banerji  1993),  and  to  the  relative  emphasis  on  advertising 
versus sales promotions (Steenkamp  1997), among others. 
3.  OPERATIONALIZING THE POWER OF STORE BRANDS 
3.1.  Intrinsic loyalty versus conquesting power 
Given  the  significance  of  store  brands  for  retailers  and  manufacturers  alike,  it 
becomes  important  to  have  a  managerially  meaningful  measure  of  store-brand  power. 
Retailers can use it to  assess the power of their own brand within a particular category vis-
a-vis  other  (national  and  private  label)  brands,  as  well  as  across  categories  to  identify 
possible  weaknesses  in  their  portfolio  of product  categories  in  which  they  offer  their 
private label.  Manufacturers can use  this information to  plan competitive actions to  thwart 
the  growing  strength  of store  brands  in  the  product  categories  in  which  they  are  active. 
Previous  studies  (e.g.,  Hoch  and  Banerji  1993;  Corstjens  and  Corstjens  1995,  Raju  et al. 
1995)  have  mainly considered the  number of private  labels  in  a product category  and the 
store  brands'  market  share  as  relevant  performance  measures.  A  large  market  share, 
however, can be driven by two conceptually very  different factors:  the  existing customers 
can be loyal to  the brand, or the  brand can be  successful in  attracting customers  who  are 
willing to switch brands. 
In  this  paper, we operationalize the power of store brands vis-a-vis each other and 
vis-a-vis  national  brands  along  these  two  dimensions,  i.e.  the  brands'  "intrinsic  loyalty" 
and their "conquesting power."  The intrinsic loyalty of a brand refers to  its  ability to  keep 
its  current  customers.  A  critical  issue  for  the  continued  success  of  any  retailer  or 
manufacturer  is  its  capability  to  retain  its  current  customers  and  make  them  loyal  to  its 
brands.  Brand loyalty  has  consistently  been  linked  to  profitability  (Aaker  1991).  Indeed, 
the  costs of attracting a new  customer have been found  to  be  up  to  six times  higher than 
the costs of retaining old ones (Rosenberg and Czepiel  1983), loyal customers are typically 
less  price  sensitive  (Krishnamurthi  and  Raj  1991),  and  the  presence  of a  loyal  customer 
base  provides  the  firm  with  valuable  time  to  respond  to  competitive  actions.  A  large 
number of loyal customers  is  a competitive asset for  a brand,  and  has  been  identified as  a 
major determinant of its  power (Aaker  1991). 
5 The  second  component  of a  brand's  strength  is  its  conquesting  power.  Markets 
always  exhibit a substantial  amount  of dynamism.  Consumers enter or leave  the  market, 
brands  are  eliminated,  new  brands  are  introduced,  etc.  Moreover,  all  markets  have  a 
proportion of consumers that is  not loyal to  any  specific brand, but who  can be considered 
switchers  (Colombo and Morrison  1989;  Lal  and  Padmanabhan  1995).  Hence,  the  ability 
of a store brand to  keep a large proportion of its  current customers is  not enough, because 
inexorably,  this  basis  will  be  eroded  (see  e.g.,  East  and  Hammond  1996).  For  the 
sustained  health  and  growth  of store  brands,  it  is  also  necessary  to  continuously  attract 
new customers.  The conquesting power of a brand refers to  the proportion of the market's 
non-loyal customers (i.e., that fraction of the market that is  not  loyal  to  any  of the current 
players) that one is  able  to  attract in a given time  period.  The underlying hope  is  then to 
eventually convert these  non-Ioyals  into  loyal  customers  after they  have  had  a number of 
satisfying brand experiences. 
The  two  components  of brand  power  can  be  combined  in  a  2x2  Brand-Power 
Matrix,  yielding four quadrants  (see  Figures  2 and 5 below):  low or high intrinsic loyalty 
combined with low or high conquesting power.  The  upper-right-hand quadrant is  clearly 
the most attractive. The brand commands a high degree of brand loyalty among its current 
customers,  and is  able  to  attract many  non-loyal  switchers  as  well.  A  store brand which 
falls  into this category is  clearly very  powerful,  and we label those brands "Giants".  The 
lower-left-hand  quadrant  are  the  "Misers",  as  they  are  neither  strong  on  intrinsic  loyalty 
nor on conquesting power. Thus,  misers are  relatively,.weak on  both accounts.  "Fighters" 
combine low intrinsic loyalty with high conquesting power.  These brands have  to  "fight" 
for customers each time they are  shopping, but are  successful in doing so.  Still, they  may 
have  to  make  frequent  use  of price  reductions  or  other  promotional  techniques  in  their 
day-to-day  business  operations  to  make  their  brand  appealing  to  the  group  of potential 
switchers  (see  also  Lal  and  Padmanabhan  1995).  Indeed,  their  low  score  on  the  loyalty 
dimension  suggests  that  a  large  part  of their  customer base  will  not  "automatically"  re-
purchase  the  brand,  but  rather  will  re-evaluate  all  options  again  on  their  next  purchase 
occasion.  Finally,  in  the  lower-right quadrant  are  brands  that  combine  high  loyalty  with 
low  conquesting power.  We label  these  brands "Artisans"  as  they  have  a loyal  following, 
6 but  will  not  attract  large  groups  of new  customers.  They  are  relatively  static  like  the 
artisans or guilds in the Middle Ages. 
Giants  obviously  occupy  the  most  attractive  position,  while  Misers  take  the  least 
attractive position.  Fighters and Artisans are  located in  between.  Which of the  latter two 
is  more  attractive  depends  on  the  strategic  goals  of the  company. If the  goal  is  to  create 
short-run  market-share  gains,  Fighters  may  be  more  attractive.  They  capture  a  larger 
portion of the switching segment, and will hence often enjoy a larger market share with all 
its  advantages  (e.g.,  Buzzell  and  Gale  1987).  On  the  other  hand,  Artisans  command  a 
higher  degree  of brand  loyalty.  Given  the  advantages  of a loyal  following,  Artisans  may 
be more profitable in the long run. 
The Brand-Power Matrix can be used for  several strategic purposes. First, provided 
the  focal  store brand is  used in multiple categories, it  can be  used in  an  absolute  sense in 
that its position across these different categories can be compared to uncover strengths and 
weaknesses  in  the  private label's total  offering or product portfolio,  using  absolute cutoff 
values  for  loyalty  and conquesting power.  Second,  the  Brand-Power Matrix can be used 
in a relative sense in that the  relative performance of the focal  store brand is  plotted vis-a-
vis  other brands within the same category. 
3.2.  Measurement of  the components of  store-brand power 
We  use  the  model  of Colombo  and  Morrison  (1989)  to  measure  the  two  components of 
store-brand  power.  This  model  is  well  established  in  the  marketing  literature  (see  e.g., 
Bayus  1992,  Dekimpe  et  al.  1996,  Kannan  and  Sanchez  1994),  its  parameter  estimates 
have clear managerial  interpretations, it is  robust,  and  the  data requirements  are  few.  The 
input to  the  model  is  a switching  matrix  whose  elements  (i,j)  represent the  proportion of 
consumers  that  bought brand  i  on  one  purchase  occasion  but  switched  to  brand j  on  the 
next occasion.  The  element (i,j) therefore  gives  the  conditional probability  that  brand j  is 
purchased,  given  that  i  was  bought the  previous  time.  The  key  underlying  assumption  of 
the  model is  that there are two  kinds of consumers: 
•  people who are  intrinsically loyal, and stay with the same brand, and 
•  potential  switchers,  who  on  every  purchase  occasion  choose  between  all 
7 brands according to  a zero-order process. 
All  potential switchers are  assumed  to  have  the  same  probability to  buy  a specifIc  brand, 
but  this  probability  may  differ  across  brands.  The  proportion  of loyal  buyers  and  the 
potential  switchers'  choice  probabilities  are  linked  to  the  elements  of  the  observed 
switching matrix through: 
Pii  a i  +  (1  - a)  rc  i  f 
P ij  (1  - a i)  rc  j 
(1 ) 
where  Pij  is  an  element  of the  switching  matrix,  1ti  the  proportion  of potential  switchers 
buying brand i, and a i  the  proportion of the current buyers of brand i who  is  intrinsically 
loyal.  The  first  equation  states  that  the  (conditional)  probability  to  repurchase  brand  i 
depends  on  (1)  the  proportion  of loyals  (ai),  and  (2)  the  proportion  (1t;)  of the  potential 
switchers [(I-a;)] who decided to re-purchase brand i  after all.  The second equation shows 
how  the conditional probability Pij equals the proportion (1t)  of the potential switchers  [(1-
a;)]  which chooses brand j. Clearly,  every actual  switcher is  a potential switcher,  but not 
every repeat purchase comes from a loyal customer. a i  and 1ti  are estimated for  each store 
brand or national brand that is  included in the switching matrix.  Note that although ai  and 
1ti  can both vary between °  and  100,  there is  no  simple relation between the two because 
they  refer to  a different base.  The former refers  to  the proportion of the  current buyers of 
a particular brand that is  intrinsically loyal, while the  latter refers  to  the proportion of the 
total  number of switchers  in  the  market  that  will  buy  your brand.  a i  will  in  general  be 
larger than  1ti,  but this  has  no  intrinsic meaning as  they refer to  different bases.  We refer 
the  interested  reader  to. the  original  Colombo  and  Morrison  article  for  mathematical 
details.  In  terms  of our  two  dimensions  of store  brand  i's  power,  it  is  clear  that  a i 
measures its intrinsic loyalty, while 1ti  is  a measure of the brand's conquesting power. 
4.  CASE STUDY: THE MARKET POWER OF ALBERT HEIJN'S STORE BRAND 
We  will  use  our  procedure  to  analyze  the  power  of  Albert  Heijn's  store  brand  ("AH 
Huismerk").  Albert  Heijn  is  the  "flagship"  of  the  Royal  Ahold  concern.  In  a  recent 
Corporate Image Barometer study among Dutch decision makers,  Albert Heijnl  Ahold rated 
8 highest  of all  major  Dutch  companies  (Adformatie  1996).  Royal  Ahold  also  owns  BiLo, 
Stop  &  Shop,  Edwards,  Giant,  Tops,  and  Finast  in  the  US,  and  a  variety  of supermarket 
chains  in  a  number of other countries.  It  plans  to  open 200-1,000  supermarket outlets  III 
the Far East in  the  next five  years  (Perspekt  1996, Vriens  1996). 
Albert  Heijn  is  the  largest  grocery  retail  chain  in  the  Netherlands  with  a  market 
share in  1996 of 27.9% (Perspekt  1996), and is  widely perceived to  be the  most innovative 
Dutch grocery retailer.  It has pursued a conscious strategy of developing and promoting its 
own store  brand in  a  large  number of product categories. It also  promotes  its  store brand 
in  its  print and television advertising. 
4.1.  Data description 
Panel  data  describing  the  purchase  histories  in  1994  .  of  approximately  4,000  Dutch 
households  in  19  different product categories  were  provided by  GfK Foodscan,  which is 
part  of  the  pan-european  market-research  agency  GfK.  All  product  categories  were 
frequently-purchased  grocery  products,  covering  a  variety  of  foodfbeverage  (e.g., 
margarine,  beer),  personal-hygiene (e.g.  sanitary  towels)  and  pet-food  (e.g.,  dry  cat food, 
canned  cat  food)  products.  In  each  product  category,  multiple  brands  were  available, 
including  Albert Heijn's (AH)  store  brand,  other store  brands  as  well  as  national  brands. 
For each category, the intrinsic loyalty (a.;)  and conquesting power (n;)  of the three largest 
national brands and of the store brand for three major retail chains (AH, Edah, and C 1000) 
were  estimated.  Moreover,  we  added  an  "others"  category  to  the  switching  matrix  to 
accommodate the  purchases  of smaller brands.  This  was  done  to  avoid biased  parameter 
estimates (Colombo and Morrison  1989). 
A  switching matrix  was  constructed for  each product category,  using  all  purchases 
the  panelists  made  in  1994.  When  a  given  household  made  multiple  purchases  in  the 
same category on  the  same  day,  it  was  impossible  to  empirically  determine  the  purchase 
order.  In  those  instances,  the  purchases  were  placed  in  a  random  order  (cf.  Harlam  and 
Lodish  1995).  Thus,  separate estimates  of the  intrinsic  loyalty  and conquesting power for 
six  brands  (3  national  brands  and  3  store  brands)  were  obtained  for  each  of these  19 
product categories. 
9 The GfK panel data also  allowed  us  to  compute some market characteristics.  The 
level  of concentration  was  computed  as  the  sum of the  market  share  of the  three  largest 
brands  (Dekimpe  et  al.  1996).  Information  on  prices  at  which  the  various  brands  were 
bought was also available. For each category, we  determined the  average purchase price of 
the  AH  store  brand  and  the  average  price  of the  three  leading  national  brands  over  the 
considered  one-year  period,  the  latter  weighted  by  their  market  shares.  One  minus  the 
ratio  of these  two  prices  represents  the  average  price  discount  at  which  the  AH  brand is 
sold (Hoch and Banerji 1993). 
Two  variables  that  might  prove  useful  in  explaining  differences  in  brand  power 
were not available in the  GfK data, viz.,  consumer involvement with the  product category, 
and  consumers'  quality  perceptions  of the  various  brands  in  each  category  (Aaker  1991, 
Assael  1995, Steenkamp  1989).  To obtain a measure of these variables, we  used a survey 
in  which consumers were  asked to  rate  their involvement with  up  to  seven  categories,  as 
well as  the quality perception of the AH brand and of the three leading national brands in 
each  category.  The  consumer  needed  to  be  a  user  of the  category  in  order  to  provide 
ratings.  Order of categories and brands  were randomized.  The total  sample consisted of 
100  randomly-selected consumers living in  a medium-sized town in the Netherlands.  Data 
were  collected  in  personal  interviews  using  computer-aided  questionnaires.  Product-
category  involvement  was  measured  with  the  following  three  7-point  bipolar  items 
(Zaichkowsky  1985,  Steenkamp  and  Wedel  1991):  not  at  all  important/very  important, 
does  not  matter to  me/matters  a  lot  to  me,  and  does  not  interest me  at  alliinterests  me  a 
lot.  The reliability of the  involvement  measure was  a high  .88.  Consumers'  judgment of 
the  perceived  quality  of the  brands  were  measured  on  two  7-point  scale  bipolar  items: 
bad/good quality  and  unattractive/attractive  (Steenkamp  1989).  The  two-item measure of 
perceived quality was highly reliable (a =  .89).  For both measures, direction of the poles 
was  randomized  to  reduce  yea-saying  effects.  Individual  ratings  concernmg  category 
involvement  and  brand-quality  perceptions  were  averaged  over  the  appropriate  items  to 
arrive  at  product-involvement  and  perceived-quality  ratings.  A  similar  procedure  was 
recently  used by  Narasimhan et  al.  (1996)  to  supplement their data set with data that were 
not  available from published secondary sources. 
10 In  sum,  in  our analyses  we  will  explore  the  role  of two  consumer characteristics, 
VlZ.,  product-category  involvement  and  perceived  quality  of the  brand,  as  well  as  two 
market  characteristics,  viz.,  level  of concentration  in  the  category  and  percentage  price 
discount as  possible factors  that may explain variations in  brand power. 
The presentation of the  results  is  as  follows.  First,  we  compare the  position of the 
AH  store  brand  across  all  19  product  categories  in  an  absolute  sense  (i.e.,  regardless  of 
how other brands are  doing in  these categories), and explore why AH does better in  some 
categories than in  others.  Such an  analysis  is  important as  it  provides  an  overview of the 
strength  of  AH  in  absolute  terms.  After  all,  regardless  of  the  performance  of  its 
competitors,  Albert  Heijn/Royal  Ahold  primarily  derives  its  strength  from  its  own 
marketing  and financial  performance (it  does  not  really  help  if the  competitor does  lousy 
too,  although it provides some consolation!).  Next, we shift our focus  from an  absolute to 
a  relative  setting by explicitly considering the competitive environment.  We compare the 
strength  of the  AH  store  brand  on  both  intrinsic  loyalty  and  conquesting  power  to  the 
position of leading  national brands.  We examine  the  effects  of some  key  variables  that 
may  drive  the  observed  differences  in  loyalty  and  conquesting  power  between  AH  and 
these national brands, using the pooled data set (i.e., pooled across product categories). 
4.2.  The power of  the AH store brand across product categories 
Figure 2 shows the  power of the  AH store  brand for  19  different product categories.  The 
four quadrants  of the  brand-power matrix  were created using  the  median u i  and  TCi  across 
all  brands  and  product categories.  Intrinsic  loyalty  of 73%  or  higher is  regarded  as  high, 
and  intrinsic  loyalty  lower than  73%  is  viewed  as  low.  Conquesting  power of 7.8%  is 
used as  cutoff point to  differentiate between the high and low cells.  Although these cutoff 
points  are  to  some extent arbitrary,  they  are  based on  the  actual  competitive performance 
of the  AH  brand  and  its  competitors  across  a  large  number of product  categories.  The 
location  of the  brands  in  Figure  2  is  determined  by  the  center of a  circle  whose  size  is 
proportional to  AH's market share in  the category in question. 
In  four  product categories  (decaffeinated  coffee,  regular coffee,  chocolate  strands, 
and evaporated milk (coffee cream)),  AH  is  in  an  enviable position as  its  own brand rates 
I 1 highly on both dimensions of brand power.  Given these strengths, it  is  not surprising that 
on average, the market share of AH in total sales in these categories is  15.1%. 
The  AH  store  brand  is  a  Fighter  in  the  following  categories:  green  peas,  apple 
sauce, cornflakes, orange juice, and potato chips.  Due to  its  high conquesting power, AH 
enjoys a sizable market share in these categories, on average  13.1 %.  The challenge for AH 
in  these  categories  is  to  transform  occasional  buyers  into  loyals.  High  loyalty  but  low 
conquesting  power is  exhibited  for  low-fat  margarine,  regular beer,  and  pantyliners.  On 
average,  market share  is  rather  low  (5.2%),  but  those  consumers  who buy the  AH  brand 
tend to be loyal.  A major issue for these Artisans is  to  attract switchers.  This will  not be 
easy in  these markets  as  they  are dominated by  large  multinationals  (Unilever,  Heineken, 
Procter  &  Gamble,  Kimberly  Clark).  The  AH  store  brand  is  a  Miser  in  the  following 
categories:  regular margarine, frying  margarine, light beer,  sanitary towels,  muesli, canned 
cat  food,  and  dry  cat  food.  Few  people  are  loyal  to  the  AH  store  brand  in  these 
categories, and its con  questing power is  also low.  Given this  weak market power, market 
share is  on average a low 3.4%. 
--- Figure 2 about here ---
The market shares of AH in  the  four quadrants suggests that conquesting power is 
more important in  creating market share than  intrinsic loyalty.  The difference  in  market 
share between  high- and low-loyalty categories is  on average  3.5%, while this  difference 
between  high  and  low  conquesting  power  is  on  average  10.1 %.  This  observation  is 
supported  in  a  correlational  analysis.  The  market  share  of  the  AH  store  brand  in  a 
particular category correlated .95  (p  < .001)  with  its  conquesting power in  that category, 
and .34 (p = .077) with its brand loyalty.l 
Figure  2  reveals  that  in  the  portfolio  of product categories  studied,  the  AH  store 
brand  has  some  strong  positions  (especially  in  the  first  quadrant),  but  also  quite  some 
weak  positions.  Why  does  AH  better in  some categories  than  in  others  on  one  or both 
dimensions?  What  distinguishes  Giants  from  others?  We  will  consider  the  role  of 
perceived  quality  of  the  AH  store  brand,  product-category  involvement,  market 
1  All  p-values  are one-sided. 
12 concentration, and price discount.  See Figure 3 for the means for each quadrant. 
A  key  factor  accounting  for  differences  in  AH's  brand  power  in  the  vanous 
categories  is  the  consumers'  differing  perceived quality of the  AH  store  brand  in  these 
categories.  As  mentioned above,  consumer quality  perceptions of the  AH store  brand (as 
well  as  of three  leading  national  brands)  in  each  product category  were  measured  in  an 
independent sample of consumers.  Consumers'  quality  perceptions were correlated .73  (p 
<  .001)  with  the  conquesting  power  of  the  AH  store  brand  in  the  various  product 
categories.  The quality perception of the  AH store brand in categories in which it exhibits 
relatively  high conquesting power is  higher (M =  5.12)  than  in  those  categories  where  its 
conquesting power is  relatively low (M = 4.45). 
Perceived quality  also  distinguishes between  high  and  low  brand  loyalty,  although 
to  a  much  weaker  extent.  AH's  intrinsic  loyalty  in  a  category  was  correlated  only  .08 
with the  perceived quality of the AH store band in the category in  question.  The effect is 
very weak but in the direction that you  might expect:  higher quality leads  to  higher brand 
loyalty  (Aaker  1991).  Perceived  quality  of the  AH  store  brand  is  on  average  4.86  in 
categories  in  which  it  exhibits  relatively  high  loyalty  and  4.71  in  categories  where  its 
brand loyalty is relatively low. 
In  sum,  AH  tends  to  command  both  a  higher  loyalty,  but  especially  a  higher 
conquesting  power in  those  categories  where  its  quality  is  perceived  to  be  higher.  The 
effect  is  especially  strong for  Giants.  On average,  consumers perceive  AH's Giants to  be 
of substantially  higher quality  (mean perceived quality  rating of 5.31)  than the AH brand 
in the other categories (M =  4.62).  Illustrative is  the difference between AH decaffeinated 
coffee (a Giant)  and  AH regular margarine  (a Miser).  The former has  a perceived quality 
rating  of 5.59,  and  exhibits  high  intrinsic  loyalty  (86.7%)  and  high  conquesting  power 
(19.2%)  while the latter has  a  much lower quality rating of 4.26,  and only modest loyalty 
(61.1 %)  and conquesting power (5.3%). 
The  price-discount  variable  revealed  an  interesting,  and  at  first  sight  counter-
intuitive, relation with conquesting power (r = -.27, P =  .13).  A higher price discount was 
associated with lower conquesting power.  The AH store brand sold at an  average discount 
of 12.3%  in  the  high conquesting-power categories,  versus  an  average  discount of 24.6% 
13 in  the  low-conquesting-power categories.  The reason  is  that,  as  we  have  seen  above,  the 
AH  brand  in  the  high-conquesting-power categories  are  of substantially  higher  perceived 
quality.  High perceived quality provides consumers with another reason to  buy the  (store) 
brand  than  only  price,  and  perceived  quality  IS  an  effective  barrier  against  price 
competition  (Buzzell  and  Gale  1987,  Steenkamp  1989).  Thus,  perceived  quality  of the 
brand clearly emerges as  a key driver for  AH's store-brand power across categories. 
The relations with level of concentration and consumer involvement were less clear 
cut  as  only  one  quadrant  differed  from  the  others.  (Such  a  situation  is  not  adequately 
captured  in  a  simple  correlation coefficient.)  The  level  of concentration  was  highest  for 
the  Misers:  M = 69.5% versus 62.9% for  the other three categories combined.  It  is  clearly 
more  difficult  to  build  a  strong  store  brand  in  categories  with  a  high  level  of 
concentration,  which  is  in  line  with  recent  findings  of Dhar  and  Hoch  (1996).  Finally, 
consumer  involvement with  product  categories  in  which  AH  has  Fighters  is  lower  than 
involvement with the other categories (M = 4.42 versus 4.93).  Fighters are categorized by 
relatively  low  loyalty  and  high  conquesting  power.  They  are  most  likely  to  occur  in 
markets  where there are  many  switchers  in the  first  place.  Product categories  with  many 
switchers are typically characterized by low consumer involvement (Van Trijp et al.  1996). 
--- Figure 3 about here ---
4.3.  The market power of AH vis-a-vis the three leading national brands in  the category 
Hitherto,  we  considered  the  absolute  levels  of  Albert  Heijn's  loyalty  and  conquesting 
power in  each category.  Equally  important is  to  analyze  Albert Heijn's position  relative 
to  other brands in  a particular category.  Such an  additional analysis provides an enhanced 
perspective  on  the  power  of  the  AH  store  brand  in  the  marketplace.  AH  may  be 
underutilizing  its  possibilities,  leading  to  a  lower  relative  performance  on  either  or  both 
dimensions of brand power, or it  may be doing better than the  national brands, even when 
in  an  absolute  sense,  its  performance  is  not  fully  satisfactory.  We  first  provide  two 
illustrative  examples,  pertaining  to  green  peas  and  frying  margarine.  Next,  we  formalize 
our analysis by considering all categories.  We examine the effect of possible market- and 
14 consumer-related  factors  on  differences  in  relative  performance  of  AH  vis-a-vis  the 
average of the  top  three  national  brands  weighted  by  their  respective  market shares,  in  a 
given category. 
The  relative power of the AH store brand:  two illustrative examples 
Figure 4  (upper  panel)  shows  the  position  of the  AH,  Edah,  and  C 1000  store  brands  as 
well  as  of three  leading national green-peas brands,  viz.  Bonduelle, Hak,  and  lonker Fris, 
in  terms  of their  intrinsic  loyalty  and  conquesting  power.  The  areas  of the  circles  are 
again  assigned  in  proportion  to  the  brand's  market  share  in  guilders  in  each  specific 
category  (as  such,  the  absolute  sizes  of the  areas  in  Figures  4A and 4B  are not directly 
comparable).  Although all  three national brands as  well as  AH  are Fighters, AH's market 
power  is  actually  strong  vis-a-vis  the  leading  national  brands.  Its  intrinsic  loyalty  IS 
higher  than  the  intrinsic  loyalty  of Bonduelle  or  Hak,  while  its  conquesting  power  IS 
second only to  the market leader,  Bonduelle.  In  line  with these observations,  AH  has  the 
second  largest  market  share.  C 1000  and  Edah  are  far  less  successful:  although  brand 
loyalty is  at about the same level as  the  other brands, their conquesting power and market 
share are low. 
Compare this  situation to  the brand power of AH  vis-a-vis  the  other brands in the 
frying-margarine  market  (Figure  4,  lower  panel).  The  frying  margarine  market  is 
dominated  by  two  heavily  advertised  Giants,  Croma  and  Becel.  Both  are  owned  by 
Unilever, and together have captured nearly  80% of the  market.  In  this category, AH is  a 
miser,  while  the  other  two  store  brands  fall  in  the  artisan  category.  The  third  largest 
national  brand,  Sense,  is  owned  by  a  relatively  small  company.  It  is  a  Fighter  brand 
which cannot match  the  advertising expenditure of the  Unilever brands,  and  is  to  a  large 
extent  dependent  on  attracting  switchers.  In  this,  it  is  reasonably  successful,  but  not 
nearly  as  effective  as  Croma,  the  oldest  brand  in  this  category,  which  appeals  to  broad 
strata in Dutch society. 
--- Figure 4 about here ---
15 The  relative power of the AH store brand across 19 categories 
The above analysis clearly illustrates  that the  relative competitive position of AH  vis-a-vis 
the  other  brands  differs  substantially  between  categories.  We  will  now  extend  this 
analysis  to  all  19  product  categories.  To  keep  the  analysis  manageable,  we  compare  the 
relative  position  of AH  on  both  dimensions  of brand power with  the  average  of the  top 
three  national  brands  (weighted  by  their  respective  market  shares)  in  a  given  category. 
Figure  5  presents  the  results.  From a relative  point of view,  Albert Heijn's portfolio  has 
two  giant performers,  viz.,  green peas  and chocolate strands.  For these  two  products,  the 
AH  intrinsic loyalty  as  well  as  its  conquesting power is  higher than  those  of the  average 
of the leading national brands.  AH has no  Fighters in a relative sense.  In the  panty liner, 
muesli,  and  canned cat-food categories,  AH  is  doing  relatively  well  on  loyalty,  but lags 
considerably  behind  the  leading  national  brands  in  its  ability  to  attract  switching 
consumers.  In the remaining  14  categories, AH scores below the  weighted average of the 
three leading national brands on both dimensions of brand power,  although the  power gap 
is  small  for  some categories, such as  apple sauce.  The gap in  brand power between AH 
and  the  leading  national  brands  is  especially  large  for  frying  margarine,  light  beer,  and 
cornflakes.  Interestingly,  two  of these  three  product categories  are  dominated by  a  large 
multinational,  with  widely-recognized  marketing  capabilities  (i.c.,  Unilever,  Kellogg's), 
while  the  light  beer  market  is  dominated  by  a  brand  from  a  smaller company,  Bavaria, 
which has  virtually created this  category.  This represents  a good example of an  on-going 
first-mover advantage. 
--- Figure 5 about here ---
What  are  key  factors  underlying  the  differences  in  relative  position  between  AH 
and the  leading national brands on loyalty and conquesting power?  To examine this issue, 
the  difference  between  the  brand  loyalty  of AH  and  the  weighted  average  of the  three 
leading  national  brands  (UAH-UAvgNat)'  as  well  as  the  difference  between  the  conquesting 
power of AH and the  weighted  average of the  three  leading  national  brands  (ITAH-ITAvgNat)' 
was  correlated  with  the  relative  quality  of  the  AH  brand  vis-a-vis  the  three  national 
brands,  market  concentration,  the  price  discount  at  which  the  AH  brand  is  sold,  and 
consumer involvement with the category. 
16 AH's relative  perceived  quality  as  compared  to  the  three  leading  national  brands 
was  related to  the  difference in  conquesting power (r  = -.51, P < .01).2  The relation  with 
the  loyalty  gap  was  in  the  expected  direction,  but  was  weak  and  not  approaching 
significance  (r  = -.11).  Interestingly,  AH's  Giants  exhibited  a  distinct  profile.  Their 
"quality  discount"  was  on  average  only  8.9%  versus  17.1 %  for  the  Misers  and  Artisans 
combined. 
Another  key  factor  is  market  concentration.  The  more  concentrated  the  markets 
are,  and  hence  the  more  market  power  leading  brands  possess,  the  greater  the  gap  with 
AH,  both  on  brand loyalty  (r =  -.48,  P <  .05)  and  on  conquesting  power  (r  =  -.76,  P < 
.01).  AH's  two  relative  Giants  are  in  categories  with  low  market  concentration  (M  = 
46.9%)  as  compared  with  an  average  market  concentration  for  the  other  categories  of 
67.5%. 
Product-category involvement nor price discount exhibited a substantial correlation 
with  either  dimension  of relative  brand  power,  but  involvement  revealed  an  interaction 
effect in that the profile of the Giants again exhibited a distinct profile.  AH's giants were 
in relatively low-involvement categories (M =  4.42 versus 4.85 for the other categories). 
Comparing the  relative and absolute power of the AH store brand 
A  comparison  of Figure  2  and  5  clearly  illustrates  how  both  analyses  (in  absolute  and 
relative  terms)  should be  studied together  to  better appreciate  the  performance of AH on 
the  loyalty and conquesting dimension.  In  five  product categories,  AH is  an  absolute  as 
well  as  relative  miser:  dry  cat food,  sanitary  towels,  regular margarine,  frying  margarine, 
and  light  beer.  That  is,  AH  scores  low  on  loyalty  as  well  as  conquesting  power, 
irrespective  of  the  absolute/relative  classification.  AH  is  a  true  Giant  for  chocolate 
strands. In both an absolute and a relative sense, the  AH store brand performs very well in 
its  ability  to  retain its  current consumers and  to  capture a high  proportion of the  market's 
switching  consumers.  Finally,  it  is  an  Artisan  in  both  senses  for  panty  liners.  For  the 
2  The  weighted  average  of  the  quality  ratings  of  the  three  leading 
national  brands  in  the  category  in  question  was  computed,  using  market 
shares  as  weights.  One  minus  the  ratio  of  the  perceived quality rating  of 
the  AH  store  brand  and  the  weighted  average  of  the  three  leading  national 
brands  represents  our measure  of  relative quality of  the  AH  store brand. 
l7 other 12  product categories,  the  relative perspective sheds  a different light on  AH's brand 
power  than  the  absolute  perspective.  The  most  interesting  cases  are  represented  by 
decaffeinated  coffee,  regular  coffee,  and  evaporated  milk.  In  an  absolute  sense,  their 
loyalty  and  conquesting  power  is  very  high;  they  are  true  Giants.  However,  on  both 
dimensions  of brand  power,  they  perform  less  than  the  weighted  average  of the  three 
leading national brands.  It is  doubtful whether AH will  actually be able to  do  much better 
in  these categories,  as  they  are  dominated by  a single  brand (Douwe Egberts  for  the  two 
coffee categories and Friesche Vlag for evaporated milk,  with market shares of 54%, 54%, 
and  32%,  respectively)  which  is  heavily  advertised,  and  which  is  the  "flagship"  of the 
company in question.  Hence, strong retaliatory action by these brands may be expected to 
any move by AH. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Our findings  indicate that the power of a store brand, even for such a powerful retailer as 
Albert  Heijn,  varies  dramatically  across  product  categories,  both  in  an  absolute  and  a 
relative  sense.  In  some  product  categories,  AH  does  very  well,  whereas  in  other 
categories,  it  struggles on either the  loyalty  dimension,  the conquesting-power dimension, 
or both.  Perceived quality emerged as  a prime factor underlying AH's conquesting power. 
The higher the  perceived quality  of the  AH store brand,  both absolute  and  relative  to  its 
competitors,  the  greater  its  conquesting  power.  Further,  AH's  conquesting  power  was 
found  to  be  strongly  correlated  with  its  market  share.  Hence,  the  implication  that 
improving product quality is  a prime way  to  build market share.  This finding  is  especially 
interesting  as  the  role  of higher  perceived quality  in  attracting  switchers  has  traditionally 
received less attention in  the marketing literature; promotions are often seen as  the primary 
instrument  (cf.  Lal  and  Padmanabhan  1995).  Our  findings  indicate  that  the  quality  of 
store  brands is  also a key  to  their success  in  the  market place,  which confirms trade-press 
reports (see e.g., AGBIEuropanel 1992), and is  consistent with Hoch and Banerji (1993). 
Our analyses also suggest that retailers may  want to  reconsider whether they should 
introduce a  store  brand  in  categories  where,  for  a variety  of reasons,  they  are  not  able  to 
match  or approach  the  quality  of the  national  brands.  Even  a  retailer  like  Albert  Heijn 
18 was  often not able  to  build a strong brand nor a large  market share in  categories where its 
quality  perception  was  relatively  low,  although  sometimes  the  AH  brand  was  sold  at  a 
steep discount.  One example is  regular margarine,  with  a perceived quality  rating of 4.26 
(versus a weighted average of 5.47  for  the  three  leading  national  brands),  a price discount 
of almost 30% and  a market share of about 3%.  Interestingly, the  price-discount variable 
was  not found  to  be  a major driving factor of market power:  private labels can sometimes 
be  bought primarily  for  quality reasons,  rather than  for  price  reasons.  Actually,  the  price 
discount  for  the  AH  brand  was  in  general  less  for  categories  where  it  had  greater 
conquesting  power  and  market  share,  because  AH  was  able  to  offer,  according  to 
consumers,  high-quality  products  in  these  categories.  In  two  categories  (apple  sauce  and 
coffee),  the  AH  brand  was  even  sold  at  a  higher  price  than  the  average  of the  three 
national brands.  In  these respects,  the  positioning and quality-improvement efforts of AH 
mirror strategies  pursued in Great Britain,  probably  the  most  innovative  country  in  terms 
of private  labels.  Originally  introduced  as  "best-value"  products,  store  brands  in  such 
chains  as  Asda  and  Safeway  now  often  occupy  "top-of-range"  areas  of their  markets  to 
raise  the  chains'  image  and  to  encourage  consumer  loyalty.  As  one  British  manager 
explains:  "If you  have  a  nucleus  of products  which  customers  see  as  having  a  quality 
image,  there  is  an  inevitable  dynamic  created."  This  strategy  has  also  been  adopted  by 
Carrefour in  France:  "They  [Carrefour  private  label  products]  always  have  an  edge with 
the consumer that other labels would not be able to  match.  This will be,  depending on the 
market,  a better quality  than the  leading  brand,  a keener price  for  the  same  quality,  or a 
new  product,  sharper,  better  performing  or  more  practical."  (AGBIEuropanel  1992,  pp. 
181,  188). 
This  raises  the  question  what  national-brand  manufacturers  can  do  against  the 
onslaught  of private  labels?  First,  our  findings  indicate  that  the  single  most  effective 
strategy  is  continuous  product-quality  improvement  and  product  innovation.  National 
brands  should  continuously  innovate  to  keep  the  private  labels  at  bay.  National-brand 
manufacturers  can  be  expected to  have  more  insight  into  consumer needs  with  respect  to 
their  specific  product  category  (after all,  a  supermarket  chain  has  to  spread  its  attention 
across  numerous categories), and be  more  knowledgeable about the  manufacturing process 
19 and  technological  changes.  This  provides  a  viable  basis  for  quality  improvement  and 
innovation.  A  case  in  point  is  the  potato-chip  market.  At  first  sight,  this  may· not  be 
perceived  to  be  a  market  with  much  innovation  potential.  However,  the  market  leader, 
Smiths,  has  introduced a  number of quality  improvements in  the  last decade  (e.g.,  crispy 
chips, extra quality ribbed chips, new  packaging), and its  perceived quality rating is much 
higher  than  AH's  (6.23  versus  4.87).  Associated  with  this  difference  is  a  big  gap  in 
conquesting power (39.8% versus 8.2%) and market share (44.1 % versus 7.4%). 
Few  store  brands  can  afford  to  pay  for  the  research  and  development  needed  to 
develop  really  new  or  improved  products,  and  this  could  therefore  offer  a  strategic 
advantage  to  national brands.  However,  it  should be  noted that retail chains increasingly 
introduce genuine innovations as  well.  For example, Sainsbury introduced soft drink cans 
with a revolutionary new way to open them (Floor 1996).  One of the aims of Carrefour is 
to  introduce  new  products  that  perform  better  than  leading  national  brands 
(AGBIEuropanel  1992),  and  Albert  Heijn  is  leading  the  way  in  environmentally-friendly 
packaging and production methods. 
Second, manufacturers should also invest more heavily in advertising.  Although we 
did  not  have  information  on  advertising  spending,  previous  research  indicates  that  it 
strengthens  brand  loyalty  (e.g.,  Aaker  1991).  Advertising  can  be  used  to  build  brand 
associations  and to  convey the  message that quality has  improved.  Evidence from Great 
Britain  (The  Economist  1993)  and  the  US  (Boch  and  Banerji  1993)  suggests  that  in 
categories  characterized  by  heavy  advertising  spending,  store  brands  are  less  likely  to 
capture  a  high market share.  Manufacturers seem to  get this  message as  the  share of ad 
spending as  share of total market spending increased from a  low of 53% in  1991  to  56% 
in 1995. 
Third,  manufacturers can strengthen their position by  exploiting their international 
presence,  if applicable.  An  international  brand image can be  a  source of brand strength. 
As  the  international  branding  consultant  Kapferer  argues  (1992,  pp.  212,  222):  "Many 
brands  acquire  further  credibility  when  they  prove  to  have  international  appeal.  That  is 
why,  in  1989,  Ariel brought out the  first  advertising commercial featuring  testimony  from 
housewives  from  different  European  countries  .....  When  the  brand  is  perceived  as  being 
20 international,  its  authority  and  expertise  are  automatically  accepted."  Most  retail  chains 
are  still regional or national,  rather than international, although this  too  may change in  the 
future.  Retail  companies  like  Ikea,  Carrefour,  Delhaize,  Makro,  Wal-Mart,  Ahold,  and 
Aldi are pursuing international expansion strategies in  Europe, the  US,  Latin America, and 
Asia.  Moreover,  many  (European)  retailers  are  organized  in  international  buying  groups 
such as  ERA (members are  Ahold, Argyll, and Casino) or Deuro-Buying (Asda, Carrefour, 
Makro,  Metro).  Such  buying  groups  may  provide  a  platform  for  pan-European  store 
brands. 
Finally,  manufacturers  may  decide  to  "Sleep  with  the  Enemy"  (or  at  least  the 
Rival),  by trying to  profit from  the  growing popularity of store brands,  and engage in  the 
production  of  private  labels  for  retailers.  More  than  50%  of all  US  manufacturers  of 
branded  packaged  consumer  goods  including  companies  like  Dole,  Borden,  Kraft,  and 
Heinz,  engage  in  such  private-label  production  (Quelch  and  Harding  1996).  Other 
companies  like  Heineken,  Gilette,  Mars,  and  Coca Cola have  refused  to  do  so.  Private-
label  production  can  Increase  total  sales  volume  and  helps  to  reduce  occasional  excess 
production  capacity.  On  the  other  hand,  the  profit  margin  is  typically  lower,  there  is 
cannibalization  on  own-brand  sales,  and  store-label  production  can  result  in  additional 
manufacturing  and  distribution  complexities  that  add  costs,  rather  than  reduce  them 
(Quelch and Harding  1996).  This complex interface between cooperation and competition, 
which Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) label co-opetition,  needs further research, as  it 
will  determine  to  a  large  extent  the  long-run  profitabilty,  and  perhaps  even  the  very 
survival, of some national brands. 
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